Climate misinformation has changed considerably over the past two decades.
Research from the 1990s documented organised attempts in the United States to question the evidence behind global warming, downplay its consequences and argue that policies addressing it would cause more harm than the problem itself. McCright and Dunlap (2000) found all three arguments in material published by prominent conservative think tanks between 1990 and 1997.
The scientific position has strengthened considerably since then. The IPCC now states that human activities, principally through greenhouse gas emissions, have “unequivocally caused global warming”. Climate misinformation has not disappeared as this evidence has strengthened. Instead, an increasing share of misleading communication has moved towards a different question: what should be done about climate change?
Research over the past few years shows this change in particular quite clearly. Lamb et al. (2020) examined arguments that accept climate change but still justify weak or delayed action. Responsibility can be shifted elsewhere, limited measures can be presented as sufficient, the costs of action can be exaggerated, or meaningful mitigation can be dismissed as no longer possible. Importantly, the authors also recognise that such arguments can contain partial truths, however, the issue is how these partial truths are used to discourage meaningful action.
More recent research by Nicolosi et al. (2025) analysed more than 200,000 social media posts between 2021 and 2023. They found misinformation increasingly directed at climate solutions and their supporters, rather than primarily at climate science itself, referred to as the “New Denial”. While their discoveries are rather specific to social media, they still provide a good illustration on how far climate misinformation has moved from simply claiming that climate change is not real.
For small and medium-sized companies, this makes climate misinformation harder to recognise. A questionable claim may concern renewable energy, an environmental regulation, emissions reductions or the cost of a particular climate policy. It can appear in a supplier document, industry report, consultancy presentation or proposed partnership without containing a single statement denying climate change.
Recognising these arguments first requires understanding how organised climate misinformation has developed.
From ‘manufacturing doubt’ to organised climate change denial
A crucial part of the history of climate change denial begins with the tobacco industry.
By the 1950s, tobacco companies faced strong scientific evidence linking cigarette smoke with cancer. Their response was not simply claiming that smoking cigarettes was harmless, rather a more effective strategy was to keep the science looking unsettled. Remaining uncertainties were emphasised, sympathetic scientific voices received support and individual disagreements were used to create doubt around a much larger body of evidence.
Oreskes and Conway (2010) traced how some of the same scientists and methods later appeared in disputes over acid rain, the ozone layer, second-hand smoke and climate change. The strength of the strategy was relatively simple: regulation becomes harder to justify if the public and policymakers believe the underlying science is still uncertain.
By the 1990s, climate change denial in the United States had developed into a much wider network. Science journalist Sharon Begley used the term “denial machine” in a 2007 Newsweek investigation into what she described as a well-funded campaign involving contrarian scientists, free-market think tanks and different actors related to the fossil fuel industry. Academic research examined these relationships in greater detail, showing how funding, institutional networks, political interests and media visibility helped amplify a relatively small number of contrarian voice
Conservative think tanks played an important role in this network.
Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman (2008) analysed 141 English-language books promoting environmental scepticism between 1972 and 2005. More than 92 per cent were linked to conservative think tanks, either through their authors, publishers or both. They also found that 90 per cent of conservative think tanks involved in environmental issues promoted environmental scepticism. The authors concluded that this was an organised response from within the conservative movement aimed at challenging environmentalism and environmental protection.
This discovery is particularly important because the publications did not represent a broad range of independent sources. Much of the apparently diverse sceptical literature was connected to the same network of conservative institutions.
Money was also an important part of this structure. Brulle (2014) examined the finances of 91 US organisations involved in the climate change counter-movement between 2003 and 2010. Together, they had an annual income of just over $900 million, while identifiable foundation support averaged $64 million per year. The overwhelming majority of that foundation support came from conservative foundations. Brulle also found that funding was increasingly routed through intermediary organisations that distributed donations on behalf of funders without publicly identifying the original donors. This made some of the financial links much harder to trace and allowed donors to remain anonymous.
These vast financial resources provided the organisations involved with the means to maintain staff, produce publications, organise events and remain active in public and political debate over extended periods.
Farrell (2016) examined this relationship more directly. His study covered 164 organisations involved in the US climate change counter-movement and more than 40,000 texts they produced between 1993 and 2013. Organisations receiving corporate funding were more likely to produce material that polarised the climate debate, and corporate funding also influenced which themes were promoted.
The connection with conservative politics also became increasingly visible. McCright and Dunlap (2011) analysed ten nationally representative US surveys conducted between 2001 and 2010. They found a growing division between Democrats and Republicans, with Democrats and liberals considerably more likely to hold views consistent with the scientific consensus than Republicans and conservatives. Climate change has increasingly become tied to political identity in the United States.
This does not mean that conservative politics itself constitutes climate misinformation, or that criticism of a climate policy is inherently misleading. It does show that organised climate denial in the United States developed through identifiable links between conservative think tanks and foundations, corporate interests, fossil-fuel interests and political actors. Leaving those relationships out would give an incomplete account of how climate misinformation developed.
How the climate denial machine works
A small set of organised networks can amplify marginal claims and make them appear larger, more credible, and more independent than they are.
Figure 1. How the climate denial machine works: a synthesis of the funding, institutional networks and amplification mechanisms discussed in this article
Climate misinformation no longer needs to deny climate change
The arguments have changed as well as the political environment around them.
Coan et al. (2021) analysed material published over twenty years by conservative think tanks and climate contrarian blogs. They found recurring claims ranging from rejecting global warming or human responsibility to downplaying its effects, attacking climate solutions and questioning the reliability of climate scientists. Their study shows that arguments against climate action were already an important part of organised climate misinformation, alongside attacks on the science itself.
This distinction has become increasingly important.
A statement such as “renewable energy has environmental impacts” can be perfectly accurate. It becomes misleading when those impacts are presented as sufficient evidence that renewable energy has no climate benefit, without comparing them with the environmental and climate costs of the alternatives.
The same problem appears when responsibility is shifted elsewhere. An SME may be told that reducing its emissions is meaningless because another country or industry emits considerably more. Similar issues and debates resurface every now and then, but it does not answer whether the company’s own measure is effective, worthwhile or consistent with its objectives.
Cherry-picking works in a similar way. A failed renewable energy project, an unusually cold winter or an individual scientific paper may all be real, but none can represent the wider evidence on its own.
Uncertainty can also be misused. Climate models cannot predict every future outcome precisely, but this does not make them useless. The same principle applies to most decisions involving future risk. Uncertainty needs to be understood and communicated, not treated as evidence that nothing can be concluded.
These are useful warning signs because misleading arguments do not necessarily depend on fabricated information. Accurate facts can still be used selectively or connected to conclusions they do not support.
When visibility and expertise are not the same thing
Climate misinformation has also benefited from the way scientific disagreements are sometimes presented publicly.
The so-called ‘duelling scientist’ scenario is a form of false balance. A scientist representing a position supported by the large majority of relevant climate research may be placed opposite a contrarian scientist and given similar airtime, visual prominence and apparent authority. The contrarian may be scientifically qualified, and in some cases may even work in climatology or atmospheric science. The issue is not the existence of scientific credentials or disagreement. It is presenting a marginal position as though it carries roughly the same scientific weight as a position supported by a much larger body of research.
McCright and Dunlap (2003) documented how this worked in US climate debates. The five prominent sceptics they examined included climatologists and an atmospheric scientist, but also an astrophysicist and a retired professor of environmental science. Several were also affiliated with conservative think tanks. The authors showed how these scientists were promoted as credentialled experts and gained increasing visibility in Congress and major newspapers, despite representing a small dissenting position within the wider scientific community. In other words, the ‘duel’ did not necessarily match an expert with a non-expert. It matched two individuals in a way that could make the underlying scientific support for their positions appear far more equal than it actually was.
Petersen, Vincent and Westerling (2019) measured this wider problem by comparing 386 prominent climate contrarians with 386 climate scientists across approximately 200,000 scientific publications and 100,000 print and digital media articles. Across all media sources, contrarians appeared in 49 per cent more articles. The difference was smaller in established mainstream media, but that does not mean the false-balance problem disappeared: across 30 major outlets, the two groups received almost equal visibility despite substantial differences in scientific authority. In a more detailed analysis of six major outlets, including Fox News, the New York Times and Washington Post, the authors also found that contrarians were more likely to appear through mentions or non-scientific quotations, while climate scientists were more likely to contribute scientific quotations or authorship. Fox News stood out for its particularly frequent use of non-scientific quotations.
The duelling scientist scenario
How a small minority position can be presented as an equally credible scientific debate
Figure 2. Equal airtime does not mean equal scientific weight. Illustration of the “duelling scientist” scenario discussed by McCright and Dunlap
For companies, a similar principle applies when assessing unfamiliar information. Visibility, a senior title or a professional-looking report does not establish whether somebody has the relevant expertise or whether their conclusion reflects the wider evidence.
The useful questions are usually simpler: what evidence supports the claim, who produced it, whether their expertise is relevant, and whether the conclusion actually follows from the information presented.
The same scrutiny should apply to partnerships
Information is not the only way these risks can reach a company.
An unfamiliar research institute, consultancy or other organisation may approach an SME proposing a meeting, event, site visit, joint research or future cooperation. There is nothing unusual about such approaches, but the level of access should match how much is known about the organisation and the proposal.
Imagine that an unfamiliar institute approaches a sustainability-focused company. It proposes a sizeable delegation, future research cooperation and institutional exchange, despite there being no previous relationship. The purpose remains broad, there is no defined research question or expected output, and some of the proposed participants or affiliations cannot easily be verified.
There is no need to make assumptions about the organisation’s motives. There is, however, a clear reason to ask for more information before agreeing to the visit.
Why was the company selected? Who will participate? What does the organisation want to learn or produce? What information or introductions will it request? How will the meeting be described afterwards? Will photographs, quotations, the company name or its logo be used publicly?
These details become more important as the relationship becomes more visible. Even a private introductory video call could potentially carry some reputational weight, if a contrarian actor uses that footage for legitimacy laundering, meaning to further a contrarian agenda by promoting an introductory call similar to the “duelling scientist” scenario. A delegation, public event or formal partnership carries considerably more weight.
The same approach can be applied when the organisation’s own publications or public positions raise concerns. Verify what can be verified first. If the answers are clear, the relationship can develop. If they remain vague, access can remain limited.
This is normal due diligence applied to information and reputation.
A practical guide for SMEs
Companies do not need an elaborate system for every climate claim or new contact.
The level of scrutiny should reflect the decision being made.
Before repeating a climate claim publicly, it is reasonable to establish where the evidence comes from, whether the source has relevant expertise, whether an important comparison has been left out and whether the conclusion is stronger than the evidence supports.
Before entering a new institutional relationship, it is equally reasonable to establish who the organisation and its participants are, why the company has been approached, what the proposed cooperation involves and how the relationship will be presented publicly.
These checks do not prevent disagreement. Climate technologies can fail. Policies can be badly designed. Environmental claims should be challenged when the evidence does not support them. Different organisations will also have legitimate differences over costs, priorities and the speed of transition.
The distinction is between disagreement supported by evidence and arguments that distort, omit or selectively present that evidence.
Climate misinformation has changed because outright attacks on climate science are no longer the only way to obstruct climate action. Research now documents misinformation around solutions, responsibility, costs and the credibility of people supporting climate policies. At the same time, the organised networks that helped shape earlier climate denial remain important for understanding where many of these arguments came from.
For SMEs, the response does not need to be complicated.
Know what is being claimed. Check where the evidence comes from. Understand who you are dealing with before lending them your company’s name or credibility.
That is the purpose of Mímesis’ Climate Information Integrity guide: to make those checks easier without turning ordinary business decisions into lengthy investigations.
Proceed
Material claims, roles and intended use are verifiable
Evidence is traceable, relevant and proportionate to the claim
Purpose and public use are clear
Revise
The issue can be corrected with better evidence, scope or qualification
Clarify wording, evidence or scope
Proceed after revision
Pause
Relevant roles or affiliations cannot be verified
Purpose, outputs or public use remain unclear
Pause and seek more information
Decline
Evidence remains weak, selective or untraceable
Relevant roles or affiliations remain undisclosed after clarification
Identity-use or reputational risk cannot be controlled
Protecting your company’s reputation and making informed sustainability decisions does not require complex processes—just the right criteria at the right time. At Mímesis Think Tank, we support small and medium-sized enterprises in verifying climate narratives, auditing potential partnerships, and safeguarding their sustainability strategies through our specialized micro-consulting services. If you want to assess your risks or validate your environmental claims with technical rigor, please fill out the form below and our team will get in touch with you.
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